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Notes tagged “web”

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2026

  1. Code From Strangers

    A map of web security before the deep dives — one asymmetry that explains every attack, five questions the mechanisms answer, and the vocabulary you need so none of the rest reads as noise.

  2. HSTS: It's Time to Go HTTPS-Only

    The header that makes HTTPS non-negotiable — no SSL stripping, no click-through, no fast rollback. Turn it on. Then think carefully before you preload, because that part you cannot take back.

  3. Nobody Shares Your Address Space

    COOP, COEP and CORP are presented as three related headers. They are three doors into one process — and Spectre is why the browser cares who is inside it, not just what they are allowed to read.

  4. One Defect, Three Surfaces

    CORS allowlists, OAuth redirect URIs and open redirects have separate vulnerability literatures and the same bug — a structured identifier tested with a string operation. The fix is one sentence, and a standards body finally wrote it down.

  5. Strings Do Not Remember Where They Came From

    Trusted Types does not make XSS impossible — the spec says so itself. It makes unreviewed assignment impossible, which is a smaller claim and a far more useful one.

  6. The Credential That Predates the Origin

    Cookies do not obey the same-origin policy — they never have. Thirty years of attributes, flags and name prefixes are one long retrofit, and knowing which parts actually hold is most of session security.

  7. The Header That Grants Nothing

    CORS does not protect your server. It relaxes a rule about who may read a reply — and almost every misconfiguration comes from believing it does the opposite.

  8. Two Parsers Walk Into a DOM

    Every HTML sanitizer is a second implementation of a parser it does not control. Mutation XSS is what happens in the gap — and it is why the fix eventually had to move inside the browser.

  9. Why Your Progressive Approach to Web Security Fails

    Adding a security header can only tighten what reaches the browser; nothing you add can loosen it. Loosening is a hand edit of the policy already shipped — and that asymmetry is why incremental hardening degenerates into permissive sprawl, and why deny-by-default with a report-only rollout is the only shape that survives a real application.

  10. Don't Write the Policy. Derive It.

    A security policy is a claim about every case you did not think of. State the invariant instead, enumerate what the system can actually do, and let a model checker hand you the counterexample.

  11. Where Did This Request Come From?

    The Sec-Fetch-Site, -Mode, -Dest and -User headers answer a question servers could never ask — and turn a class of cross-site attacks into a four-line check.

  12. Can I Use This Library?

    A strict CSP quietly turns every dependency into a security decision. Here is the tree I walk to make it — per library, and across a whole app.

  13. The Header That Can't Be Cached

    Cache-Control from first principles — and why a page carrying a CSP nonce must be told never to be stored, not merely "don't cache."

  14. Trust No Script

    Why a strict Content Security Policy is one of the hardest headers to deploy — and how to read one with Google's CSP Evaluator.

  15. Scaffolding a Typographic Portfolio Site

    The design philosophy behind this site — why it's built from durable tools and a purposeful type system instead of a framework, and why every choice is aimed at lasting.